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In a laboratory experiment, we investigate if groups consisting of two
heterogeneous player types (with diﬀerent marginal contribution costs) can
increase their total contributions and payoﬀs in a threshold public goods
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voluntary contributions and transfers, this redistribution eﬀect takes a few
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1. Introduction
Can redistribution aﬀect allocative decisions and bring about welfare in-
creases? This question has been approached in the past by Bös and Kolmar
(2003) whose theoretical answer is aﬃrmative, but not unconditionally so.
In their example of two land-owners who can reallocate their properties (by
a unanimous decision) to more eﬃciently utilize their assigned share of land,
redistribution by means of voluntary transfer payments requires some kind
of enforcement mechanism, or constitution as they call it. However, they
also show that an inﬁnitely repeated interaction of the two land-owners (and
likely their descendants) can achieve a similarly eﬃcient result, if such a
societal rule does not exist.1
We experimentally investigate this theoretical result, by studying the ef-
fects of transfer payments in a threshold (or step-level) public goods game
(see, e.g., Croson and Marks, 2000; Ledyard, 1995, for an overview) with
players that have heterogeneous marginal contribution costs. This means
that one unit of contribution is cheaper in terms of money for some of the
players and more expensive for others, e.g., due to a diﬀerence in produc-
tivity. We ﬁnd a beneﬁcial eﬀect of transfer payments on group payoﬀs in
this context under two decision rules that are very similar to the enforcement
mechanisms considered by Bös and Kolmar (2003):
1. A binding unanimous vote on contribution vectors and transfer pay-
ments at the same time.
1For additional literature on the associated concept of anarchy see also Bös and
Kolmar (2003).
2
2. A repeated interaction of the same group of players employing individ-
ual voluntary contributions and transfer payments.
There is a broad range of examples for threshold public goods games
in which contributions are chosen either collectively or individually and to
which our results apply. This includes local or regional undertakings to col-
lect support for a public project, like a public library or a new highway, and
even extends to global challenges, like preventing climate change or cleaning
up the oceans. Everybody beneﬁts if the public good is provided, everybody
can contribute in some form or another, but the most eﬃcient solution is not
necessarily for everybody to take a hand in a library's or highway's construc-
tion or to swim the Paciﬁc to ﬁsh for plastic bottles. Accordingly, threshold
public goods games pose a similar allocation problem to the land-owner ex-
ample described by Bös and Kolmar (2003), because there are many ways to
share the cost burden among the stakeholders, some of which may be more
eﬃcient than others. In the climate change example, higher contributions
(in the form of eﬀorts to reduce carbon emissions) by China and India have
a large potential to increase overall eﬃciency (besides being essential to even
reaching the global reduction target), but these countries are unwilling or un-
able to increase their eﬀorts on their own (e.g., Duscha and Ehrhart, 2015).
Here is where redistribution via transfer payments comes into play: If some
contributors ought to increase their share in order to increase eﬃciency, they
may need to be compensated by other contributors who are consequently
able to reduce their own share.
If contributions are chosen collectively, transfer payments can be negoti-
ated (and later implemented) at the same time as contributions. The coun-
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cil of a city, representing a community that demands a new bridge, may
negotiate with a local construction company (also staﬀed with community
members) that could be hired to build this bridge, but the company will
likely expect an advance payment before it starts construction. As a part of
the clean development mechanism (e.g., Olsen and Fenhann, 2008), transfers
in the form of emission certiﬁcates are granted to Non-Annex I countries,
including most importantly China and India, if these exceed their nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) (see also Duscha and Ehrhart,
2015). These certiﬁcates can then be sold to Annex I countries, like the U.S.
or European countries, which can use them to more easily fulﬁll their own
reduction targets, meaning that both sides can proﬁt from the arrangement.
On a local or regional level, compliance with any agreement is ensured
by a higher authority, namely the constitution to which Bös and Kolmar
(2003) refer as well. International treaties, which lack such a higher authority
that enforces agreements, must instead be designed to induce compliance,
i.e., be renegotiation-proof (Finus, 2001). Fortunately, this is easily achieved
by implementing contributions and transfer payments simultaneously (or at
least over a concurrent period of time), a possibility that Bös and Kolmar
(2003) appear to overlook.
If contributions are instead chosen individually, our game relates to reward-
based crowdfunding.2 Here, the initiator of the crowdfunding campaign rep-
resents a (group of) player(s) with an idea for an interesting project, but high
opportunity costs for investing their own money. Involving other contribu-
2See Mollick (2014) for an empirical study on crowdfunding platforms, like, e.g.,
www.kickstarter.com, last accessed on June 15, 2015.
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tors in the project spreads the investment over many people, some of which
may have lower opportunity costs. The heterogeneity in this context there-
fore exists in the marginal cost of providing money itself. In exchange for
their contributions, the investors are promised rewards in proportion to their
contribution. On the other hand, contributions are completely refunded if
the funding goal is not reached. Although crowdfunding is mostly used to ﬁ-
nance commercial products, the same principle is occasionally also employed
to support communal undertakings, like for example a public library, which
create positive externalities and can therefore be considered public goods.
The Ocean Cleanup, a current project to remove plastic garbage from the
Paciﬁc Ocean, is even crowdfunded on an international level.3 Since political
negotiations among the aﬀected countries are another way to bring about
such international projects of public interest, our investigation may help in
the decision which of the two decision rules to apply.
Note that heterogeneity with respect to marginal costs (or productivity)
is a necessary requirement to achieve eﬃciency increases by means of re-
distribution. If the players have heterogeneous endowments (e.g., Rapoport
and Suleiman, 1993; van Dijk et al., 1999; Bernard et al., 2014; Alberti and
Cartwright, 2015) or heterogeneous valuations of the public good (e.g., van
Dijk et al., 1999; Croson and Marks, 1999, 2001; Bernard et al., 2014) the al-
location of the threshold does not aﬀect the group's total payoﬀ, because the
total cost of the threshold contribution is the same no matter which player
contributes.
The experimental literature on either individually or collectively chosen
3See www.theoceancleanup.com, last accessed on October 20, 2015.
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contributions to public goods has so far produced few relevant results re-
lated to transfer payments. With respect to the case of individual voluntary
contributions, we note that, although experimental investigations of transfer
payments (in the form of zero-sum rewards) in linear public goods games have
already repeatedly demonstrated such a beneﬁcial eﬀect on total payoﬀs (e.g.,
Walker and Halloran, 2004; Gürerk et al., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter
et al., 2010), this eﬀect relies on incentives to raise total contributions (anal-
ogously to the punishment eﬀect ﬁrst reported by Fehr and Gächter, 2000).4
Furthermore, rewards appear to wear out their use after some time, so that
both total contributions and payoﬀs decrease again (e.g., Sefton et al., 2007).
In contrast, total contributions in threshold public goods games remain com-
paratively stable over time if a full refund of contributions is granted in case
the threshold is not reached (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2001). Accordingly, this
variant is better suited to studying a possible redistribution eﬀect of trans-
fer payments, by which eﬃciency is increased without aﬀecting contribution
levels. Moreover, a previous study by Feige et al. (2014) reports a potential
for eﬃciency increases in a threshold public goods game with heterogeneous
marginal costs, but no refund. We accordingly adapt parts of their design
for our own investigation.
Feige et al. (2014) also investigate a binding unanimous vote on contri-
bution vectors, where they ﬁnd a similar potential for eﬃciency increases
through redistribution. Heterogeneous marginal costs are rarely investigated
otherwise, with the exception of Margreiter et al. (2005) in whose study con-
tributions to a common-pool-resource game are decided by a majority vote
4See Chauduri (2011) for a review of the literature on sanctions in public goods games.
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(see also Walker et al., 2000). Other relevant studies with homogeneous play-
ers are Alberti and Cartwright (2011)  in which the players do not actually
vote, but must coordinate on a multi-dimensional vector of contributions to
the (threshold) public good  and Kroll et al. (2007)  in which binding and
non-binding majority voting on contributions is contrasted in a linear public
goods game.
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀects of transfer pay-
ments in threshold public goods games, although there are a few studies
that investigate a similar design. Cabrales et al. (2012) study a coordina-
tion game in which the players can ﬁrst choose between a costly high eﬀort
and a costless low eﬀort to earn payoﬀs and then vote on a redistribution
of their earnings. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) ﬁnd that voting behavior
to redistribute payoﬀs from rich to poor subjects is consistent with Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) preferences of inequality aversion. A possible sanction-
ing eﬀect of transfer payments (as rewards) on contributions in threshold
public goods games can be compared to the eﬀect of punishment in the same
game. Here, Andreoni and Gee (2015) show that institutional punishment
can also increase eﬃciency in threshold public goods games, although results
from an earlier study by Guillen et al. (2006) indicate that their hired-gun
mechanism is likely to be abolished in a collective decision by all group
members.
As we directly integrate transfer payments into our experimental design
and furthermore do not allow verbal communication among the subjects of
any kind, we can avoid the problems5 that have led Fiorina and Plott (1978,
5Most importantly, any side agreements, whose resolution is postponed until after the
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p. 577) and other researchers to explicitly forbid their subjects the use of
side-payments of any kind in treatments with face-to-face negotiation (inci-
dentally, this also includes the use of physical threats, cf. Fiorina and Plott,
1978, p. 594).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The theoretical model
and its solutions are described in Section 2, followed by the experimental
design and procedure in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our
experimental investigation. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of
our results.
2. Theoretical Model
2.1. Basic game
The basic game consists in a two-stage decision process in which a group
of four players 1) simultaneously choose their contributions to a public goods
game with a contribution threshold and 2) simultaneously choose individual
transfer payments to bestow upon their fellow players.
Each player i = 1, . . . , 4 starts with the same endowment e which he can
spend on his contribution qi ∈ [0, q¯] to the public good. The contribution
vector q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) lists the individual contributions of all players in
this group. There are two player types  one with high marginal contribution
costs, cH , and the other with low marginal costs, cL, cH ≥ cL > 0, which
speciﬁes the conversion rate from endowment to contribution. Each group
contains two players of each type.
experiment, are beyond the control of the experimenter.
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The total contribution given by Q =
∑4
i=1 qi must reach the threshold
T , i.e., Q ≥ T . Otherwise each player suﬀers a damage payment d which is
deducted from his remaining endowment.6 The contributions are refunded
in this case. We set q¯ < T ≤ 2q¯, so that one player alone cannot reach
the threshold, but two players can. This means that low-cost players do
not depend on high-cost players to be able to reach the threshold, and vice
versa.7 Furthermore, we assume 4d > cHT to make sure that reaching the
threshold is not only feasible, but also collectively proﬁtable for all possible
allocations of T among the players.
If the total contribution reaches the threshold, each player i can use his
remaining endowment, i.e., e − ciqi, to make bilateral transfer payments tij
to every other player j, whose ﬁnal payoﬀ is then increased by the trans-
ferred amount. Although individual players i can make (or receive) net
transfer payments ti :=
∑
j 6=i [tji − tij] that are diﬀerent from zero, all net
transfer payments sum to zero, i.e.,
∑4
i=1 ti = 0. This means that (unlike in
punishment games) no welfare is lost in the process.
Player i's payoﬀ pii(q, ti) is therefore given by:
pii(q, ti) =
 e− ciqi + ti if Q ≥ Te− d if Q < T (1)
As, in this basic game, transfer payments to other players decrease a
player's payoﬀ with no additional beneﬁt, all subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
6A reward of the same amount if the threshold is reached results in a theoretically
equivalent game.
7This assumption is not critical to our theoretical results, but simpliﬁes matters some-
what.
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(SPNE) have tij = 0 for all i and j. Apart from that, any feasible vector
of individual contributions8 that exactly reaches a total contribution of Q =
T in the ﬁrst stage can be implemented as a SPNE if it is the result of
strategies that make zero transfer payments in the second stage. In fact,
the set of allocations that can be implemented as equilibria is identical to
that in the game without transfers. Note that this involves a coordination
problem because there are many ways in which this total contribution can
be allocated among the players.
In addition to this large number of strict threshold equilibria,9 there are
also many combinations of weakly best responses which result in a Pareto
inferior total contribution of Q < T , including also the zero-contribution
vector q0 = (0, 0, 0, 0), also referred to as the status quo in the following.
These equilibria are the direct result of the refund rule in case the threshold
is not reached.
2.2. Welfare-maximizing allocations
Due to the player heterogeneity with respect to marginal contribution
costs, only a subset of the feasible threshold allocations will be socially opti-
mal. In order to calculate these welfare-maximizing (WM) outcomes, assume
that the contribution vector qWM = (qWM1 , . . . , q
WM
4 ) maximizes the groups
welfare (or total payoﬀ) given by Π(q) =
∑4
i=1 pii(q, 0). We call this vector
qWM socially optimal and refer to QWM =
∑4
i=1 q
WM
i as the socially optimal
8A contribution vector is feasible if both qi ∈ [0, q¯] and qi ≤ d/ci are satisﬁed for all
players i.
9To be precise, weak threshold equilibria can also exist, in which a player i is indif-
ferent between contributing a share of qi = d/ci and contributing zero.
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total contribution. Given that QWM = T , it is both socially and individually
optimal for the players to reach the threshold value. Among these threshold
allocations, social welfare is maximized by any contribution vector qWM that
completely allocates T among the low-cost players.
Two other threshold allocations of interest involve either equal contribu-
tions (EC)  i.e., for all i, j: qi = qj = T4  or equal payoﬀs (EP)  i.e., for
all i, j: pii(q, 0) = pij(q, 0). Most famously Schelling (1980) argues in favor
of symmetric focal points to resolve equilibrium selection problems. Feige
et al. (2014) indeed ﬁnd in their experiment that the achieved outcomes are
more consistent with equalizing payoﬀs than maximizing welfare. It is pre-
cisely this trade-oﬀ that leads to ineﬃcient results. A preference for equal
payoﬀs is also consistent with the concept of inequality aversion developed
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
2.3. Transfer payments
What about a potential redistribution by means of transfer payments,
though? If the high-cost players were able to make a credible promise to
share their earnings from the WM outcome, welfare maximization and equal
payoﬀs could be achieved at the same time. We now present two variants
of the basic game, which are able to sustain such a credible promise and
also form the basis for our experimental treatments: a repeated interaction
among the players by playing the basic game multiple times and a unanimous
vote by which contributions and transfer payments are collectively decided
at the same time.
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2.3.1. Transfer payments and repeated interactions
Transfer payments should give low-cost players an additional incentive to
contribute according to qWM, if they expect high-cost players to reciprocate
their high contributions with generous transfers. As mentioned before, if the
basic game is played only once, it is not individually optimal to pay a positive
ex-post transfer, because there are no repercussions for not doing so. Such
payments only reduce the transferring players' payoﬀs.
Yet matters are diﬀerent if the players interact repeatedly. All equilibrium
outcomes of the basic game can also be implemented as SPNEs of a ﬁnitely
repeated game. In addition, the optional transfer payments create equilibria
in which transfer payments are used to redistribute payoﬀs. In the light
of the experimental evidence pointing to a preference for equal payoﬀs, the
following subset of equilibria is of particular interest:
Proposition 1. In a ﬁnitely repeated threshold public goods game with trans-
fer payments, all feasible threshold allocations can be implemented as SPNEs
that assign equal payoﬀs to all players if the damage payment d is suﬃciently
large.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This immediately gives us the following result for the special case of a
welfare-maximizing (WM) threshold allocation.
Corollary 1. In a ﬁnitely repeated threshold public goods game with transfer
payments, any welfare-maximizing threshold allocation can be implemented
as a SPNE that assigns equal payoﬀs to all players if the damage payment d
is suﬃciently large.
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With respect to our experiment, these results yield the following hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 1. Transfer payments will be used in the repeated game to im-
plement a welfare-maximizing allocation with equalized payoﬀs.
2.3.2. Transfer payments and collective decisions
A second approach to incentivize transfer payments takes into account
the fact that public good provision is often decided cooperatively, e.g., by a
joint decision of the members of a committee representing the involved stake-
holders. This committee may negotiate contributions and transfer payments
at the same time, ﬁxing the outcome in a binding contract. As long as com-
pliance with this contract is ensured (a standard assumption in cooperative
game theory), positive transfer payments and the associated redistribution
of payoﬀs are now an optimal outcome.
For our voting scenario, we assume that the group needs to reach a unan-
imous agreement on a vector of individual contributions q = (q1, . . . , q4) as
well as on a vector of net transfer payments t = (t1, . . . , t4), which must be
zero-sum, i.e.,
∑4
i=1 ti = 0. We consider a voting procedure that consists of a
ﬁnite maximum number of voting rounds, where this maximum number is the
same as the number of repetitions assumed for the repeated game described
above. This provides the subjects with the same number of interactions as
in the repeated game.
In every voting round, each player ﬁrst makes a proposal (q, t) for a
contribution vector q and a transfer vector t. All proposals are made si-
multaneously. Then each player votes for exactly one proposal. All votes are
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also cast simultaneously. Identical proposals are combined and their votes are
added up. If there is no agreement among the players in a particular voting
round, a new round starts with new proposals and votes. If no agreement is
reached in the ﬁnal voting round, the zero-contribution vector q0 = (0, 0, 0, 0)
is used as the group's choice. This status quo outcome, which does not entail
transfer payments, is always added as an additional proposal, as well. The
subjects are fully informed about the players' types and the results of the
previous voting rounds (individual proposals and votes).
Similarly to the repeated game, the set of SPNE of this voting game is
rather large, because every allocation that constitutes a Pareto improvement
to the status quo can be implemented as a SPNE. In particular, we can
formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When employing a unanimous vote on contributions in a
threshold public goods game with transfer payments, all feasible threshold al-
locations can be implemented as SPNEs.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This speciﬁcally includes the welfare-maximizing contribution vector qWM,
as well as an outcome WM & EP in which the welfare-maximizing payoﬀs
are redistributed equally among all players by means of transfer payments.
Accordingly, again assuming that the players are attracted to outcomes that
result in equal payoﬀs to all players, we postulate a hypothesis similar to
that for the repeated game:
Hypothesis 2. Transfer payments will be used in the voting game to imple-
ment a welfare-maximizing allocation with equalized payoﬀs.
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Table 1: Investigated treatments and number of groups per treatment.
Unanimous Vote (V) Repeated Game (R)
No Transfer (NOTR) VNOTR (n = 9) RNOTR (n = 9)
Transfer (TR) VTR (n = 9) RTR (n = 9)
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
Based on the preceding theoretical sections, we implement the following
experimental design:
A group consists of four players, each endowed with e = 30 ExCU (Ex-
perimental Currency Units). Every player can convert his endowment into
up to q¯ = 10 CU (Contribution Units) which are then collected in a public
account (a common project).
In total, we consider four treatments which diﬀer with respect to the
decision rule (unanimous vote (V) vs. repeated game (R)) and with respect to
the availability of transfer payments (transfer (TR) vs. no transfer (NOTR)),
as displayed in Table 1.10 Two of the four players in each group have high
marginal costs of contribution, cH = 3 ExCU/CU, and the other two players
have low marginal costs, cL = 1 ExCU/CU. Contributions can be made in
steps of 0.01 CU, and costs are rounded to 0.01 ExCU. Unless the sum of
contributions reaches a threshold value T = 16 CU, a damage payment of
d = 25 ExCU is deducted from each player's payoﬀ instead of the contribution
costs. This means that high-cost players should rationally contribute at most
10The names used for the individual treatments in the following are simply a combina-
tion of these acronyms, for example RTR for repeated game, transfer. The participant
instructions to all treatments are included as a supplement.
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qH = 25/3 CU ≈ 8.33 CU.
In the voting treatment with transfers, proposals with a total contribution
of 16 CU or more, i.e., those that reach the threshold, can be extended by
four additional numbers (one for each player) indicating the net transfer
this player is to receive. This number is a deduction for high-cost players
(who pay the transfer) and an addition for low-cost players (who receive the
transfer). In the repeated game, the two high-cost players in each group wait
until after the individual contributions have been made, after which they
can transfer part of their earnings to each of the low-cost players separately,
but only if the threshold is reached. With the restriction that payments
can only be transferred from high-cost to low-cost players, we reduce the
complexity of the experiment. Most importantly, high-cost players in the
repeated game can directly determine their own payoﬀs in this way, without
having to anticipate returned payments from low-cost players. The repeated
game consists of ten rounds with the same group of players (partner setting).
At the end of the experiment, each player receives the payoﬀ for a single
randomly selected round. Ten rounds is also the maximum duration of the
voting treatments, in which the payoﬀs are based on the ﬁnal agreement.
Proposals, votes, individual contributions, and transfer payments are all
publicly displayed immediately after the choice has been made, together with
the IDs of the associated players (e.g., Player C). Furthermore, after the
ﬁrst round the subjects can call up the results from past rounds whenever
they have to make a decision.
According to the theory presented above, all treatments are expected to
lead to the same (optimal) total contribution of QWM = 16 CU. Table 2
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Table 2: Individual contributions qH , qL, total group payoﬀs Π(q), and individual payoﬀs
piH(q, tH), piL(q, tL), if total payoﬀs are redistributed equally, by player type (H or L) in
three allocations of particular interest: welfare-maximizing contributions (WM), equal-
payoﬀ contributions (EP), and equal contributions (EC). In the repeated game this refers
to the expected outcome in each round.
qH qL Π(q) piH(q, tH) piL(q, tL)
WM 0 CU 8 CU 104 ExCU 26 ExCU 26 ExCU
EP 2 CU 6 CU 96 ExCU 24 ExCU 24 ExCU
EC 4 CU 4 CU 88 ExCU 22 ExCU 22 ExCU
lists possible allocations of this total, whereby it is assumed that players of
the same type also make the same contribution. Allocation WM, in which
qH = 0 CU and qL = 8 CU, maximizes welfare at a total payoﬀ of 104 ExCU.11
This is the outcome that we expect to be implemented by means of transfer
payments (Hypotheses 1 and 2), resulting in equal payoﬀ shares of 26 ExCU
per player. The two other listed allocations result in equal payoﬀs (EP) or
equal contributions (EC), whereby in the former case no redistribution is
necessary to equalize payoﬀs.
During the experiment, the subjects are asked not to talk to each other
and to turn oﬀ their cell phones. They are seated at computers, which are
screened oﬀ from the other subjects by plastic screens. The instructions
to the experiment are handed out to the subjects in written form as well
as read aloud at the beginning of the experiment. Every subject has to
complete a comprehension test consisting of 9 to 13 questions depending on
the treatment. The experiment does not start until everybody has answered
11All payoﬀs given here are expected values for the repeated game where only a single
randomly chosen round is paid.
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every question correctly.
In order to rule out variations in the results due to varying fairness pref-
erences, every treatment is followed by a questionnaire containing items on
distributive justice (adapted from Konow, 1996, items 1I, 2B, and 5) and
procedural justice (partially adapted from Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Ta-
ble 1). The questionnaire also includes items related to general personal data
(age, gender, experience with experiments).12
A total of 144 subjects (4 x 9 groups with four members each) were
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a student pool. The computerized
experiment was conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Together with a
show-up fee of e3, the subjects earned on average e14.32 (roughly US$19.5
at the time of the experiment) in all four treatments. Table 3 shows the
average subject payoﬀs by treatment in ExCU and e. The subjects spent
between one hour and one and a half hours in the laboratory.
4. Results
First we show that transfer payments do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect success
rates, i.e., the frequency with which the threshold is reached, compared to
the NOTR benchmarks. Nevertheless, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence with
respect to total payoﬀs. This allows the conclusion that transfers are not (or
at least not primarily) used as a reward for positive contributions in earlier
rounds.
Success rates are high in all treatments, with all voting groups agreeing on
12The complete questionnaire is found in Appendix B. Its results show no treatment
diﬀerences and are therefore omitted.
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Table 3: Investigated treatments with average subject payoﬀs in ExCU (exchange rate:
2 ExCU = e1) and cluster-robust standard errors (in brackets) by player type.
Player type Vote (V) Repeated game (R) All
(only rounds paid)
NOTR
both 24.00 (0.00) 19.20 (1.72) 21.60 (1.04)
cL = 1 24.00 (0.00) 19.33 (1.79) 21.66 (1.07)
cH = 3 24.00 (0.00) 19.06 (2.22) 21.53 (1.28)
TR
both 25.67 (0.23) 21.62 (1.36) 23.64 (0.84)
cL = 1 25.67 (0.23) 23.46 (1.07) 24.56 (0.62)
cH = 3 25.67 (0.23) 19.78 (2.25) 22.73 (1.35)
All 24.83 (0.23) 20.41 (1.14) 22.62 (0.69)
Table 4: Absolute frequency of equal-payoﬀ (EP), and welfare-maximizing (WM) outcomes
(with associated total payoﬀs in ExCU) in groups that successfully reach the threshold
value. Success rates are given in brackets.
Unsuccessful EP WM Other Total
(20 ExCU) (96 ExCU) (104 ExCU)
VNOTR 0 9 0 0
9 of 9
(100%)
VTR 0 1 7 1
9 of 9
(100%)
RNOTR
Rd 1 2 1 0 6
7 of 9
(77.8%)
Rd 10 2 3 0 4
7 of 9
(77.8%)
All Rds 18 23 0 49
72 of 90
(80.0%)
RTR
Rd 1 2 0 0 7
7 of 9
(77.8%)
Rd 10 0 1 4 4
9 of 9
(100%)
All Rds 12 6 14 58
78 of 90
(86.7%)
a threshold allocation, and the slight diﬀerence between the repeated-game
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(R) treatments (80.0% and 86.7% over all ten rounds for RNOTR and RTR,
respectively, see also Table 4) is not statistically signiﬁcant.13
Result 1. Success rates are not signiﬁcantly higher if transfer payments are
possible.
In the following analysis of total payoﬀs, we restrict our sample to the
successful groups, because transfer payments to redistribute these payoﬀs are
only possible if the threshold value has been reached. Table 4, which takes
up the categorization into equal-pay (EP) and welfare-maximizing (WM)
outcomes,14 shows that only groups in the two transfer treatments are able
to maximize welfare. In fact, seven out of nine group in the voting treat-
ment with transfers (VTR) agree on a socially optimal outcome. In con-
trast, the uniquely relevant outcome in the voting treatment without trans-
fers (VNOTR) is the threshold allocation that equalizes payoﬀs (EP), chosen
unanimously by all nine groups. Despite the higher variance of outcomes in
the repeated-game (R) treatments, a similar pattern emerges: Groups that
employ transfers frequently maximize welfare, whereas groups that do not
employ transfers largely focus on payoﬀ-equalizing contributions.
By the end of the experiment (i.e., Round 10 in the repeated game and the
ﬁnal choice in the unanimous vote), there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the RNOTR treatment and the RTR treatment with respect to the achieved
13Fisher's exact test comparing the number of groups that provide at least 16 CU in
RNOTR and RTR treatments: p = 0.3174 (all rounds, n = 90 each), p = 0.4706 (Round
10, n = 9 each).
14Meaning contributions of qH = 2 CU and qL = 6 CU for EP as well as qH = 0 CU and
qL = 8 CU for WM, see Table 2. Equal contributions (EC) outcomes, with qH = qL = 4
CU, did not result in any of the treatments and therefore play no further role in this
analysis.
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welfare level. None of the seven successful groups in the repeated game
without transfer payments (RNOTR), but four of the nine successful groups
with transfers (RTR) contribute in a socially optimal way.15 Furthermore,
all seven successful groups in the RNOTR treatment earn a total payoﬀ of
at most 96 ExCU, while seven out of nine groups in the RTR treatment
make use of the transfer mechanism and as a consequence earn more than
96 ExCU.16 These results correspond to Hypothesis 1.
Similarly, while none of the voting groups without transfers (VNOTR)
manage to maximize their total payoﬀ,17 voting groups with transfer pay-
ments (VTR) predominantly do so and agree on WM outcomes.18 The
two VTR groups that do not maximize welfare agree on an EP outcome
(96 ExCU) and, respectively, on contribution of qL = 7 CU and qH = 1 CU
(100 ExCU). This corroborates Hypothesis 2.
Result 2. Only groups in the transfer (TR) treatments maximize welfare.
Figure 1 shows average total payoﬀs for successful groups on a round-by-
round basis. For voting groups, the data are based on average proposals until
agreement is reached. Afterwards the contribution vectors that the groups
agree on are used instead where possible. Groups that employ transfer pay-
ments clearly earn higher total payoﬀs in voting treatments. Although this
15Fisher's exact test comparing the number of WM allocations chosen by successful
groups in RNOTR (n = 7) and RTR (n = 9) treatments: p = 0.088.
16 Fisher's exact test comparing the number of successful groups with a total payoﬀ
higher than 96 ExCU in RNOTR (n = 7) and RTR (n = 9) treatments: p = 0.0032.
17All groups in this treatment in fact agree on an equal-payoﬀ outcome with a total
payoﬀ of 96 ExCU.
18Fisher's exact test comparing the number of WM allocations chosen by successful
groups in VNOTR (n = 9) and VTR (n = 9) treatments: p < 0.001.
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Figure 1: Average total payoﬀs of groups who successfully reach the threshold value. The
benchmarks for welfare-maximizing (WM), equal-pay (EP), and equal-contribution (EC)
outcomes are included as reference points. Data for voting treatments are based on average
proposed total payoﬀs in early rounds, and the ﬁnal outcome in later rounds once a group
reaches agreement.
diﬀerence takes a few rounds to develop in the repeated game, the eﬃciency
level in the transfer treatment (RTR) continuously increases and exceeds the
level of the treatment without transfer (RNOTR). Statistically, this eﬀect is
supported by the OLS regression of average total payoﬀs given in Table 5,
according to which the transfer treatments result in signiﬁcantly higher to-
tal payoﬀs both in the repeated game with voluntary contributions (dummy
variable Transfer) and under a binding unanimous vote (dummy variable
Vote x Transfer). The highest total payoﬀs are achieved by a combination
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of voting and transfer payments.
Table 5: OLS regression for total payoﬀs. The considered data
of the repeated-game treatments are average total payoﬀs for
each group, whereby the average is taken only over those rounds
in which the threshold is reached successfully by the group.
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Err.
Vote 1.983† 1.039
Transfer 3.636∗∗ 1.039
Vote x Transfer 3.031∗ 1.469
Intercept 94.017∗∗ 0.735
N 36
R2 0.704
F(3,32) 25.36
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
As total contributions do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly among treatments with
and without transfer payments, with most groups exactly reaching a total
contribution of 16 CU, the observed diﬀerences in total payoﬀs must reﬂect
in the choice of individual contributions and thus the threshold allocation on
which the subjects (at least tacitly) agree.
Result 3. Total payoﬀs are signiﬁcantly higher if transfer payments are pos-
sible.
Next, we compare the payoﬀs of the two player types in order to inves-
tigate the extent of redistribution. In the voting treatment with transfer
payments, a redistribution eﬀect is rather obvious. All groups that agree on
an outcome with a total payoﬀ higher than 96 ExCU (the social optimum
without transfers) also agree on an payoﬀ-equalizing redistribution of this
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outcome by means of transfer payments. Seven of the nine groups in the
voting treatment with transfers (VTR) agree on a WM & EP outcome.
Compared to the voting treatment without transfers (VNOTR), the payoﬀs
of both player types are at least as high in all cases (and usually strictly
higher).19 Even without a statistical test, this result is immediately obvious:
All VNOTR groups agree on the equal-payoﬀ allocation, with an individual
payoﬀ of 24 ExCU as a benchmark. Every single VTR group exceeds or at
least matches this benchmark. In seven groups, which choose allocation WM
and then share equally, all players earn 26 ExCU. Another groups agrees on
allocation EP without redistribution, yielding 24 ExCU each. In the ﬁnal
group, both low-cost players contribute 7 CU, leaving 1 CU each for the
high-cost players and payoﬀs of 25 ExCU each after redistribution. Since in
all voting groups with and without transfer payments the payoﬀs are split
equally, a statistical test for payoﬀ diﬀerences is meaningless: There are none.
Result 4. In the voting treatments, transfer payments signiﬁcantly increase
the individual payoﬀs for each player type.
Result 5. In the voting treatments, all subjects in the same group receive the
same payoﬀ. If necessary, the subjects employ transfer payments to achieve
this outcome.
In the repeated game with transfers (RTR), the greater variance of out-
comes makes it slightly more diﬃcult to discover a redistribution eﬀect. Fig-
19Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing average individual payoﬀs in successful groups of
treatments VTR (n = 9) and VNOTR (n = 9): z = 3.618, p < 0.001 (type H, type L, and
both types combined). The test is applied to group averages (to account for clustering),
which are however identical to the individual payoﬀs in all cases.
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Figure 2: Average individual payoﬀs before and after transfer payments over ten rounds
for the repeated-game (R) treatments, diﬀerentiated by cost type and using only successful
groups.
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ure 2 shows average individual payoﬀs by player type in successful groups in
the repeated-game treatments, before and after transfer payments in transfer-
ring groups. Comparing the payoﬀs only the basis of contributions (Subﬁgure
a)), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between high-cost and low-cost players in
the transfer treatment (RTR).20
Including transfer payments (Subﬁgure b)), the payoﬀ diﬀerences between
high-cost and low-cost players disappear.21 This is also related to the develop-
ment of the average amount of transfer payments over time in the RTR treat-
ments as displayed in Figure 3. Although transfer payments drop in Round
10 (from an average of about 4.00 ExCU in Round 9 to only 2.28 ExCU),
the fact that some high-cost players still pay transfers at all at this point
indicates a willingness to reciprocate for selecting the welfare-maximizing
allocation.
Result 6. In the repeated-game treatments, transfer payments are used to
signiﬁcantly reduce the diﬀerence between the two player types with respect to
individual payoﬀs.
The high-cost players in treatment RTR start out on a payoﬀ level similar
20Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing individual payoﬀs of high-cost (H) and low-cost
(L) players in the same group before transfer payments are applied: z = 2.192, p = 0.0284.
For each of the nine groups the test is applied to average payoﬀs for both players of the
same type earned (again on average) in rounds in which the group successfully provides the
public good, yielding nine observations for each type. Average payoﬀs (excluding transfers)
over all groups and rounds: 25.82 ExCU (H) vs. 23.00 ExCU (L).
21Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing individual payoﬀs of high-cost (H) and low-cost
(L) players in the same group after transfer payments are applied: z = −1.362, p = 0.1731.
For each of the nine groups the test is applied to average payoﬀs for both players of the
same type earned (again on average) in rounds in which the group successfully provides the
public good, yielding nine observations for each type. Average payoﬀs (including transfers)
over all groups and rounds: 24.29 ExCU (H) vs. 24.54 ExCU (L).
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Figure 3: Average total transfer payments from high-cost to low-cost players over ten
rounds in the RTR. The benchmark assumes that the group coordinates on a WM outcome
in each round and transfers a total of 8.8 ExCU each round in Rounds 1 to 9 to achieve
equality of payoﬀs only in regard to the expected payoﬀ over all ten rounds.
to their RNOTR counterparts, but quickly achieve a relative improvement
of their average payoﬀs. The average individual payoﬀ over all rounds of
24.29 ExCU of high-cost players in treatment RTR is accordingly signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the 23.09 ExCU earned by the same player type in the
treatment without transfers.22 The average improvement of individual pay-
oﬀs due to transfer payments is less pronounced for low-cost players, with
22Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing individual payoﬀs of high-cost players (average
value for each group taken only over successful rounds) in RTR and RNOTR treatments
(n = 9 in each case): z = 2.693, p = 0.0071.
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averages of 23.92 ExCU (RNOTR) and 24.53 ExCU (RTR), but still statis-
tically signiﬁcant.23
Result 7. In the repeated-game treatments, transfer payments signiﬁcantly
increase the individual payoﬀs of both player types.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Our study shows that redistribution by means of transfer payments can
indeed achieve an increase of social welfare in a threshold public goods game
and works in a similar way as theoretically predicted by Bös and Kolmar
(2003). Furthermore, this result holds for both tested decision rules, unani-
mous voting and voluntary contributions in a repeated game, although groups
in the latter setting have more diﬃculties employing transfer payments eﬃ-
ciently. In contrast with the experimental literature on reward payments in
linear public goods games, in which this instrument is predominantly used
myopically to reciprocate past contribution behavior and loses its potency
after a few rounds (see, e.g., Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010), transfer
payments in our study sustain cooperation until the end of the experiment.
The observed preference for equal-payoﬀ allocations furthermore speaks in
favor of redistribution instead of reciprocity as a prime motivation to use
transfer payments.
We should, however, also point out a few possible limitations of our work.
In order to attain comparability between voting and repeated-game groups,
23Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing individual payoﬀs of low-cost players (average
value for each group taken only over successful rounds) in RTR and RNOTR treatments
(n = 9 in each case): z = 2.075, p = 0.0380.
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we have restricted the experiment to (up to) ten rounds of interactions. While
this may have already been too long for some of the voting groups, ten
rounds is rather short to achieve coordination just by repeated interaction.
Consequently, some players in the repeated-game treatment with transfer
payments may not have been able to understand this mechanism well enough
to employ transfers eﬃciently. Nevertheless, our results at least provide proof
of concept, because most groups indeed increase their total payoﬀs.
Moreover, the results in the voting treatments are driven by the decision
process, which requires the agreement of all group members and therefore
obviously favors equal-payoﬀ outcomes. However, using something corre-
sponding to a unanimity rule is rather common, because this (or rather the
consensus rule) is the default procedure until other rules can be agreed upon
(e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Of course, an attempt to reproduce our
results under diﬀerent voting rules may be worthwhile. If anything, one might
criticize our choice of the non-agreement outcome or status quo. In Bös and
Kolmar (2003) this fallback outcome (the initial allocation of the land) is
determined randomly, which in the context of a threshold public goods game
carries the risk of placing the status quo among the threshold allocations,
however, and thus eliminating any possibility of a Pareto improvement.
Appendix A. Proof of propositions
Proposition 1 In a ﬁnitely repeated threshold public goods game with
transfer payments, all feasible threshold allocations can be implemented as
SPNEs that assign equal payoﬀs to all players if the damage payment d is
suﬃciently large.
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Proof: In order to equalize the payoﬀs which the players earn from con-
tributing an arbitrary threshold allocation, it is usually24 necessary to re-
distribute payoﬀs by means of transfer payments. When using backward
induction and starting in the ﬁnal round, transfer payments are not individ-
ually optimal (just like in the one-shot game). However, there are multiple
equilibria in this round, including q0, and therefore multiple outcomes to
which this subgame may be reduced in the subsequent analysis of the pre-
ceding round, making it possible to condition this ﬁnal choice on the actions
taken in earlier rounds (cf. Benoit and Krishna, 1985).
Payoﬀ-equalizing transfer payments can accordingly be implemented by
using the status quo (zero contributions) as a threat point in a trigger strat-
egy. This requires that, for every player i who has to make a positive transfer
payment in order to balance payoﬀs, this player's cumulative transfer pay-
ment is less than the payoﬀ reduction suﬀered if the status quo is triggered.
It is suﬃcient to consider the last two rounds of the game and any feasible
threshold allocation qˆ to ﬁnd a condition for d which satisﬁes the proposi-
tion: Player i faces the choice between paying the transfer payment in the
second-to-last round, which results in the same threshold allocation qˆ in the
ﬁnal round without this transfer payment, or not paying the transfer pay-
ment, which triggers the status quo in the ﬁnal round. Player i should choose
paying the transfer if
∑
j 6=i
tij < pii(qˆ, 0)− pii(q0, 0) = d− ciqˆi,
24The only exception is the unique threshold allocation that already results in equal
payoﬀs.
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which is fulﬁlled for all i if the damage payment d is suﬃciently large.
Proposition 2 When employing a unanimous vote on contributions in
threshold public goods game with transfer payments, all feasible threshold al-
locations can be implemented as SPNEs.
Proof: Feige et al. (2014) already show that proposing and then voting
for every contribution vector q that constitutes a Pareto improvement to q0
is a SPNE of the voting game without transfer payments, arguing that, if
all others players already vote for q, the remaining player faces a decision
between his payoﬀ for q and his payoﬀ for q0 of which he will choose the
former if and only if it is strictly greater. The same reasoning also applies
to vectors of the form (q, t), which include transfer payments in addition to
contributions. The set of feasible threshold allocations is a subset of this set of
Pareto improvements over q0, i.e., which result in individual payoﬀs greater
than e− d, whether these payoﬀs are generated directly via contributions or
result from a redistribution with transfer payments.
Appendix B. Questionnaire
The questionnaire used for the most part items from English-language
sources which were translated into German as literally as possible. Here,
however, we reprint the original English version of these items. Since several
of the items on procedural justice had to be slightly changed to ﬁt the context
of our experiment, we provide both the original item and our changed version
(translated from German) in these cases.
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Please answer the following questions completely. As this is about per-
sonal attitudes, there are neither right nor wrong answers.
Question 1 (Konow, 1996, item 1I)
Bob and John are identical in terms of physical and mental abilities. They
become shipwrecked on an uninhabited island where the only food is bananas.
10 bananas per day fall to their feet on land while others fall into the ocean.
They can collect as many bananas as they want by climbing up a tree, picking
them before they fall into the ocean and throwing them into a pile. In this
way Bob picks 7 bananas per day and John picks 3 per day. Thus, there
are a total of 20 bananas per day on the island. If you could decide the
distribution of bananas and wanted to be fair, which of the following would
you choose?
A. Bob gets 10 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 3 which fell, and John
gets 10, the 3 which he picked plus 7 which fell.
B. Bob gets 12 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 5 which fell, and John
gets 8, the 3 which he picked plus 5 which fell.
C. Bob gets 14 bananas, the 7 that he picked plus 7 which fell, and John
gets 6, the 3 which he picked plus 3 which fell.
Question 2 (Konow, 1996, item 2B)
Smith and Jones work in identical oﬃce jobs at a large company and have
the same experience, seniority and past performance records. Smith chooses
to work 40 hours per week and gets paid $800 while Jones chooses to work
20 hours per week and gets paid $400.
1. Very fair
2. Fair
3. Unfair
4. Very unfair
Question 3 (Konow, 1996, item 5)
Bill and Sam manage a small grocery store at diﬀerent times and on diﬀerent
days. The manager's duties are always the same and the days and times
which each work vary pretty much randomly, but Bill works 40 hours per
week while Sam works 20 hours per week. Suppose the manager's salary for
a 60 hour week is $1200. Which of the following is the most fair division of
this salary?
A. Bill gets $600 and Sam gets $600.
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B. Bill gets $700 and Sam gets $500.
C. Bill gets $800 and Sam gets $400.
Question 4
Please rate the decision mechanism used in this experiment on the provided
scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). The mechanism . . .
1. . . . gave you an opportunity to express your side. (Folger and Konovsky,
1989, Table 1, item 2)
2. . . . used consistent standards in evaluating your behavior. [originally:
. . . to evaluate your performance.] (Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Table
1, item 3)
3. . . . gave you feedback that led you to reevaluate you decisions. [origi-
nally: . . . gave you feedback that helped you learn how you were doing.]
(Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Table 1, item 5)
4. . . . was honest and ethical in dealing with you. (Folger and Konovsky,
1989, Table 1, item 1)
5. . . . was designed to achieve a fair result. [originally: . . . showed a real
interest in trying to be fair.] (Folger and Konovsky, 1989, Table 1, item
7)
6. . . . led to a result with which you were not satisﬁed. (own item)
7. . . . allowed personal motives to inﬂuence the result. [originally: . . . allowed
personal motives or biases to inﬂuence recommendation.] (Folger and
Konovsky, 1989, Table 1, item 25)
8. . . . gave you the opportunity to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the other players'
payoﬀ. (own item)
Socio-demographic questions:
 Age:
 Gender (female, male):
 How often did you participate in an economic experiment? (never,
once, two to ﬁve times, more than ﬁve times)
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Supplement – Experimental instructions
The following experimental instructions were translated from German.
Please note that the instructions are only translations for information; they
are not intended to be used in the lab. The instructions in the original
language were carefully polished in grammar, style, comprehensibility, and
avoidance of strategic guidance.
Treatment VNOTR
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The pre-
cise amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total
amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment
occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another
participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency
Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT. Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow
players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the
individual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all
players in a group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to
be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum
1
contribution. If the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are
refunded just as if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions,
the players then must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION. In the experiment, you and your fellow play-
ers vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a project.
This happens in up to ten voting rounds and proceeds as follows:
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e., new
proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful voting
round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE.
1. Proposals for contributions to the project
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the play-
ers:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are
(A, B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between
0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual con-
tributions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a
total contribution.
By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings
in Experimental Currency Units.
2
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, and resulting
earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table 1). Among these is
also a proposal called “status quo”. This proposal means that each player
makes a contribution of 0 Contribution Units (total contribution 0 CU).
Next to each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal.
Identical proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who
made this proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be up
to five different contribution proposals.
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to
vote for a proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the
right of the proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e.,
the number of votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for
which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
(b) No unanimous decision:
Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which
new votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of
0 Contribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, in-
dividual earnings of 5 Experimental Currency Units) is used for the
calculation of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional
costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the
same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  your contribution costs
(in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  25 ExCU
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YOUR PAYOFF. In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the experi-
ment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU  e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table 1)
The proposal “1.60 CU, 2.20 CU, 4.40 CU, 3.60 CU” with a total contribution
of 11.80 CU has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As
the minimum contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make a
payment of 25 ExCU instead of contribution costs.
The proposal “5.80 CU, 3.50 CU, 4.60 CU, 2.40 CU” with a total contribu-
tion of 16.30 CU exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must
therefore pay his contribution costs.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B”
and a total contribution of 16.3 CU.
Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which
add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
 Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly,
each player receives earnings of 5 ExCU.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which
add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
 Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
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Figure 1: Experimental procedure of treatment VNOTR.
 Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contri-
bution costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU
 5.8 ExCU  24.2 ExCU. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in this case,
because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may
recall the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on
the button “Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the
button “Back to Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
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ADDITIONAL REMARKS. Please think carefully about all of your decisions,
because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the
right side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that
is, e.g., 12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain
seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come
to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event,
you should only ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies!
Furthermore, please not that the game only continues after all players have made
their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT. After the experiment, we will ask you to fill in
a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk.
Only then will you be able to receive your payoff.
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Treatment RNOTR
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The pre-
cise amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total
amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment
occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another
participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency
Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT. Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contribu-
tion to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful,
your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. If
the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just
as if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players
then must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION. In the experiment, you and your fellow play-
ers each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs repeatedly
in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
1. Choice of contributions to the project
2. Result: project successful?
8
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in
a total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has
the same probability of being chosen.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE.
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution
Units by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The
group’s total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40
Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the play-
ers:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are
(A, B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed
up to a total contribution.
2. Result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contri-
bution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Ex-
perimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the
respective round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so
that except for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the
same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
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(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings your endowment (in ExCU)  your contribution costs (in
ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  25 ExCU
After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all play-
ers are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting
earnings of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other
players in the group are displayed, too.
YOUR PAYOFF. In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final
earnings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer
relevant for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was
reached in these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round
are converted into euros (2 ExCU  e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this
round which add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
 Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly,
each player receives earnings of 5 ExCU in this round.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this
round which add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
10
 Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribu-
tion costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU 
5.8 ExCU  24.2 ExCU in this round. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in
this case, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the
button “Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button
“Back to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your
contribution (Button “Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to
correct this choice if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice
and Continue”, your choice is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS. Please think carefully about all of your decisions,
because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the
right side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that
is, e.g., 12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain
seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come
to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event,
you should only ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies!
Furthermore, please not that the game only continues after all players have made
their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT. After the experiment, we will ask you to fill in
a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk.
Only then will you be able to receive your payoff.
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Figure 2: Experimental procedure of treatment RNOTR.
Treatment VTR
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The pre-
cise amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total
amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment
occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another
12
participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency
Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment.
THE PROJECT. Your task in this experiment is to choose your and your fellow
players’ contributions to a project. Your decision consists in a vote on the in-
dividual contributions of all players in a group. The contributions of all
players in a group are added up to a total contribution. For the project to
be successful, your group’s total contribution must reach a minimum
contribution. In the case of success, transfer payments can be made sub-
sequently. If the project is not successful, the contributions of all players are
refunded just as if nobody had made any contribution. Instead of the contribu-
tions, the players then must make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION. In the experiment, you and your fellow play-
ers vote on the individual contributions of all group players to a project.
Together with the individual contributions, you also vote on transfer payments
between the group players. This happens in up to ten voting rounds and
proceeds as follows:
1. Proposals for contributions to the project and for transfer payments between
the players
2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
3. Result: project successful?
If there is no unanimous agreement, Steps 1. and 2. are repeated, i.e., new
proposals are made and new votes are cast. After the tenth unsuccessful voting
round, the status quo is implemented, which means that nobody contributes
anything.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE.
1. Proposals for contributions to the project and for transfer payments between
the players
At the beginning of the experiment, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
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Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
Each player can provide up to 10 Contribution Units by investing Exper-
imental Currency Units from his endowment. The group’s total contribution
can therefore amount to up to 40 Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the play-
ers:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are
(A, B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
If the minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached, Players C and
D make transfer payments to Players A and B. In doing so, the
sum of transfer payments paid by C and D must correspond to the sum
of transfer payments received by A and B. Players C and D may each
provide a maximum of 30 ExCU minus contribution costs as transfer
payments.
Each player makes a proposal for the contribution of every single
player. All players make their proposals individually and at the
same time. In order to do this, each player chooses an amount between
0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01 CU). The individual con-
tributions from each proposal are automatically summed up to a
total contribution.
If the proposed total contribution is greater than or equal to the
minimum contribution of 16 CU, you can also propose transfer
payments between the players. In addition to the four contribution
values, the proposal then contains four additional numbers: the respective
transfer payments paid by Players C and D and the respective transfer pay-
ments received by Players A and B.
By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display the
total contribution, as well as each player’s contribution costs and earnings
in Experimental Currency Units.
The proposals (that is, contribution costs, total contribution, transfer pay-
ments, and resulting earnings) are shown to all players in a list (see Table 2).
This proposal means that each player makes a contribution of 0 Contribution
Units (total contribution 0 CU) , so that no transfer payments are possible.
Next to each proposal there is a list of the player(s) who made this proposal.
Identical proposals are displayed only once, together with all players who
made this proposal. Including the status quo, there can accordingly be up
to five different contribution proposals.
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2. Unanimous vote on the proposals
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player casts a vote for exactly one of these proposals. In order to
vote for a proposal please click on “Accept” in the column directly to the
right of the proposal. Each player then learns the result of the vote, i.e.,
the number of votes for each proposal as well as which player has voted for
which alternative.
(a) Unanimous decision (all four players vote for the same proposal):
The experiment ends with the calculation of earnings and payoffs.
(b) No unanimous decision:
Rounds 1 to 9: New proposals are made (see above, 1.), on which
new votes are then cast.
Round 10: The status quo (each player makes a contribution of
0 Contribution Units, total contribution of 0 Contribution Units, no
transfer payments, individual earnings of 5 Experimental Currency
Units) is used for the calculation of payoffs.
3. Result: project successful?
In the experiment the provided contributions must reach a minimum con-
tribution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached, each player must make a payment in Experimental Currency
Units, which is deducted from his endowment. The provided contributions
are refunded in this case, so that except for the payment not additional
costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the
same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his contribution costs.
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  your contribution costs
(in ExCU)
Players A and B:
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  your contribution costs
(in ExCU)   received transfers (in ExCU
Players C and D:
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  your contribution costs
(in ExCU)  paid transfers (in ExCU
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Every player pays 25 ExCU
All players:
Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  25 ExCU
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YOUR PAYOFF. In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the experi-
ment, the obtained earnings are converted into euros (2 ExCU  e1) and added
to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a voting round:
A total of five proposals for the group players’ individual contributions:
(See Table 2)
The proposal “1.60 CU, 2.20 CU, 4.40 CU, 3.60 CU” with a total contribution
of 11.80 CU has been made twice, but only counts as a single alternative. As
the minimum contribution is missed with this proposal, each player must make
a payment of 25 ExCU instead of contribution costs. Transfer payments are not
possible in this case.
The proposal “5.80 CU, 3.50 CU, 4.60 CU, 2.40 CU” with a total contribu-
tion of 16.30 CU exceeds the minimum contribution of 16 CU. Each player must
therefore pay his contribution costs. In addition Players C and D make transfer
payments to Players A and B.
All four players vote for “B”. The other three different proposals (“Status quo”,
“A, C”, “D”) do not receive any votes this time.
The voting procedure ends in this example with the selection of proposal “B”
and a total contribution of 16.3 CU.
Examples for the calculation of earnings:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which
add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
 Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly,
each player receives earnings of 5 ExCU.
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Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions which
add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
 Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contri-
bution costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings of 30 ExCU
 5.8 ExCU  24.2 ExCU. A payment of 25 ExCU is not incurred in this case,
because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Example for a transfer payment
In the above Example 2, the following transfer payments are now made:
Paid transfers:
 Player C: 2.8 ExCU Sum of paid transfers (C and D) = 6.3 ExCU
 Player D: 3.5 ExCU
Received transfers:
 Player A: 2.4 ExCU Sum of received transfers (A and B) = 6.3 ExCU
 Player B: 3.9 ExCU
Player A (contribution costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earn-
ings including transfer payments of 30 ExCU  5.8 ExCU   2.4 ExCU  26.6
ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second voting round, you may
recall the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on
the button “Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the
button “Back to Decision” you can return to the current voting round.
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Figure 3: Experimental procedure of treatment VTR.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS. Please think carefully about all of your decisions,
because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the
right side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that
is, e.g., 12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain
seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come
to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event,
you should only ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies!
Furthermore, please not that the game only continues after all players have made
their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
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END OF THE EXPERIMENT. After the experiment, we will ask you to fill in
a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk.
Only then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Treatment RTR
Welcome to the experiment!
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. Please read the following
instructions carefully. Here you will be told everything that you need to know for
the participation in the experiment. Please also note the following:
From now on as well as during the entire experiment no communication is
permitted. Please turn off your cell phones. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. All decisions are made anonymously, meaning that none of the
other participants learns the identity of those who made a particular decision.
For showing up on time you receive an amount of e3 Over the course
of the experiment you can earn an additional amount of up to e15. The pre-
cise amount is influenced by the decisions of the other participants. The total
amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment
occurs anonymously, too, meaning that no participant will known another
participant’s payoff. This experiment uses the currency “Experimental Currency
Units” (ExCU).
Two Experimental Currency Units are equal to e1.
Experimental Procedure
In the experiment you form a group with three other players. The composition
of this group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment and will
not change throughout the entire experiment, that is, in all ten rounds.
THE PROJECT. Your task in each of the ten rounds is to choose your contribu-
tion to a project. At the same time, all other players in your group also choose
their own contributions to this project. The contributions of all players in a group
are added up to a total contribution. For the project to be successful, your
group’s total contribution must reach a minimum contribution. In the
case of success, transfer payments can be made subsequently. If the project
is not successful, the contributions of all players are refunded just as if nobody
had made any contribution. Instead of the contributions, the players then must
make a fixed payment.
PROCEDURE OF THE DECISION. In the experiment, you and your fellow play-
ers each choose your own contribution to a project. This occurs repeatedly
in a total of ten decision rounds, which all proceed as follows:
1. Choice of contributions to the project and for transfer payments between
the players
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2. Preliminary result: project successful?
3. Choice of transfer payments
4. Final result
Attention! Steps 3. and 4. are not carried out, if the project was
not successful (see below).
The experiment consists of a total of ten such independent decisions in
a total of ten rounds. Only one of these rounds is relevant for your payoff,
however. Which of these rounds is paid will be determined at the end of the
experiment, individually for each player. In doing so, each of the ten rounds has
the same probability of being chosen.
DETAILS OF THE PROCEDURE.
1. Choice of contributions to the project
At the beginning of each round, each player has an endowment of 30
Experimental Currency Units (ExCU).
Each player’s contribution is measured in Contribution Units (CU).
In every single round, each player can provide up to 10 Contribution
Units by investing Experimental Currency Units from his endowment. The
group’s total contribution in each round can therefore amount to up to 40
Contribution Units.
The costs per provided Contribution Unit differ among the play-
ers:
Players A and B 1 Contribution Unit costs 1 Experimental Cur-
rency Unit (1 CU = 1 ExCU)
Players C and D 1 Contribution Unit costs 3 Experimental Cur-
rency Units (1 CU = 3 ExCU)
At the beginning of the experiment you will be told which player you are
(A, B, C, D). This is determined randomly.
At the same time as all of the other players in his group, each
player chooses his own contribution to the project. In order to do so,
he chooses an amount between 0 and 10 Contribution Units (in steps of 0.01
CU). By clicking on “Calculate values” you can make the program display
the corresponding amount in Experimental Currency Units, as well. The
individual contributions of all players are automatically summed
up to a total contribution.
2. Preliminary result: project successful?
In each round the provided contributions must reach a minimum contri-
bution of 16 Contribution Units. If the minimum contribution is not
reached in a particular round, each player must make a payment in Ex-
perimental Currency Units, which is deducted from his earnings in the
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respective round. The provided contributions are refunded in this case, so
that except for the payment not additional costs are incurred.
The payment if the minimum contribution is not reached is the
same for all players:
Players A, B, C, D Payment of 25 ExCU
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Every player pays his individual contribution costs.
Earnings before transfers  your endowment (in ExCU) 
your contribution costs (in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU (no transfer payments!)
Every player pays 25 ExCU
Final Earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)  25 ExCU
After all players in your group have made their contribution choice, all play-
ers are shown the total contribution of their group as well as the resulting
earnings of all players. The contributions and contribution costs of the other
players in the group are displayed, too
3. Choice of transfer payments
If the minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached, Players C and D subse-
quently make individual transfer payments to Players A and B. Players C
and D choose their transfer payments at the same time. Each of
the two players makes two separate payments, one directed at Player A and
one directed at Player B. In doing so, the sum of transfer payments to A
and B by the transferring player (C or D) may not exceed the preliminary
earnings of this player (30 ExCU minus contribution costs) in this round.
The sum of transfer payments paid by C or D, respectively, corresponds to
the sum of transfer payments received by A and B.
4. Final result
After Players C and D have chosen their transfer payments, each player
is informed about these decisions and the resulting final earnings for this
round.
Final earnings after transfer payments:
(a) Total contribution greater than or equal to 16 CU
Players A and B: Final earnings  your endowment (in ExCU)
 your contribution costs (in ExCU)   received transfers (in
ExCU)
Players C and D: Final earnings  your endowment (in ExCU) 
your contribution costs (in ExCU)  paid transfers (in ExCU)
(b) Total contribution less than 16 CU
Final earnings  30 ExCU  25 ExCU  5 ExCU
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YOUR PAYOFF. In order to calculate the total payoff at the end of the exper-
iment, one of the ten rounds is selected at random. All rounds have the same
probability of being selected. This means that you receive only the final
earnings of a single round. The results of the remaining rounds are no longer
relevant for your payoff, no matter whether or not the minimum contribution was
reached in these rounds. The earnings obtained in the randomly selected round
are converted into euros (2 ExCU  e1) and added to your show-up fee (e3).
Example for the procedure of a round:
Example 1:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this
round which add up to a total contribution of 11.4 CU:
 Player A: 1.2 CU (1.2*1 ExCU = 1.2 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.4 CU (3.4*1 ExCU = 3.4 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.5 CU (4.5*3 ExCU = 13.5 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.3 CU (2.3*3 ExCU = 6.9 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is missed in this case. Each player is refunded
the contributions he provided. Instead each player is deducted a payment of 25
ExCU, because the minimum contribution has not been reached. Accordingly,
each player receives earnings of 5 ExCU in this round. Transfer payments are not
possible in this case, because the minimum contribution has not been reached.
Example 2:
The players in a group provide the following individual contributions in this
round which add up to a total contribution of 16.3 CU:
 Player A: 5.8 CU (5.8*1 ExCU = 5.8 ExCU)
 Player B: 3.5 CU (3.5*1 ExCU = 3.5 ExCU)
 Player C: 4.6 CU (4.6*3 ExCU = 13.8 ExCU)
 Player D: 2.4 CU (2.4*3 ExCU = 7.2 ExCU)
The minimum contribution of 16 CU is reached in this case. Player A (contribu-
tion costs of 1 ExCU per invested CU) therefore receives earnings before transfers
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of 30 ExCU  5.8 ExCU  24.2 ExCU in this round. A payment of 25 ExCU is
not incurred in this case, because the minimum contribution has been reached.
Example for a transfer payment
Assume that the minimum contribution has been reached and the Player C
has earnings before transfers of 16.2 ExCU after paying his contribution
costs. From this amount he pays 0.9 ExCU to Player A and 1.9 ExCU to
Player B. After transfer payments, Player C therefore has 16.2 ExCU  0.9 ExCU
 1.9 ExCU  13.4 ExCU.
Please note that, with the beginning of the second round, you may recall
the results from preceding rounds during each decision by clicking on the
button “Result Round X” for the respective Round X. By clicking on the button
“Back to Decision” you can return to the current round. After choosing your
contribution (Button “Confirm Choice”) you have one additional opportunity to
correct this choice if necessary. As soon as you click the button “Confirm Choice
and Continue”, your choice is final.
ADDITIONAL REMARKS. Please think carefully about all of your decisions,
because they determine your payoff at the end of the experiment. Before the
actual experiment can begin, you must answer a few questions which ensure that
you have understood the procedure of the experiment and your task. You find the
questions on the left side of the screen, and you can enter your answers on the
right side. Please enter decimal numbers with a point instead of a comma (that
is, e.g., 12.34 instead of 12,34).
If you have any questions of your own during the experiment, please remain
seated quietly and raise your hand. Please wait until the experimenter has come
to your seat and then ask your question as quietly as possible. In any event,
you should only ask questions about the instructions and not about strategies!
Furthermore, please not that the game only continues after all players have made
their decisions.
Feel free to use the last sheet of these instructions for your own notes.
END OF THE EXPERIMENT. After the experiment, we will ask you to fill in
a questionnaire. Please remain seated after completing the questionnaire until we
call up your place number. Take your instructions with you to the front desk.
Only then will you be able to receive your payoff.
Thank you very much for your participation and good luck!
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Figure 4: Experimental procedure of treatment RTR.
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